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MURPHY V. NCAA: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE-AUTHORIZED SPORTS 
GAMBLING 
by: Shane Landers* 
I. INTRODUCTION
II. MURPHY V. NCAA
A. Background
B. Holding and Reasoning
III. ANALYSIS OF THE MURPHY RATIONALE
A. Does the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act Violate the
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I. INTRODUCTION
“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it 
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”1 Thus, “Congress may not 
simply ‘commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to 
enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.’”2 In Murphy v. NCAA, the United States 
Supreme Court held that a federal law that prevents States from legalizing sports gambling 
“violates the anticommandeering rule.”3 The Supreme Court’s decision in Murphy reemphasizes 
a fundamental principle of dual sovereignty—Congress is prohibited from “issu[ing] direct 
orders to the governments of the States.”4 
This Note will demonstrate how the Supreme Court correctly precluded Congress from 
barring State-authorized sports gambling. Part II of this Note provides a background and explains 
the Murphy rationale. Part III analyzes the Murphy decision, explaining how the Supreme Court 
adequately justified its ruling. Part IV concludes this Note with a discussion on public policy and 
Murphy’s effect on existing laws. 
* Staff Editor, Volume 6, Texas A&M University Law Review. J.D. Candidate, 2020, Texas A&M University
School of Law; B.A. Economics, 2017, Texas A&M University. 
1 U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
2 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992) (citing Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation 
Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)). 
3 Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1478 (2018). 
4 Id. at 1476. 
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II. MURPHY V. NCAA 
A. Background 
In 1992, Congress enacted the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act 
(“PASPA”), which precluded governmental entities from authorizing sports gambling.5 PASPA 
contained “grandfather” provisions that allowed sports gambling activities to continue in 
jurisdictions where it was already permitted.6 PASPA also “gave New Jersey the option of 
legalizing sports gambling in Atlantic City—provided that it did so within one year of 
[PASPA’s] effective date.”7 However, New Jersey waited twenty years to act. 
In 2012, the New Jersey legislature authorized a law permitting sports gambling.8 The 
National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) and the major professional sports leagues 
brought an action in federal court, arguing that New Jersey’s 2012 sports gambling law violated 
PASPA.9 The district court agreed that the law violated PASPA and the Third Circuit affirmed 
the district court’s ruling.10 The Supreme Court denied certiorari because New Jersey was free to 
repeal prohibitions against sports gambling “that it had chosen to adopt prior to PASPA’s 
enactment.”11 
In 2014, New Jersey enacted a new law that repealed some existing prohibitions on sports 
gambling.12 The NCAA and the professional sports leagues returned to federal court and 
challenged New Jersey’s new law.13 Again, the district court and the Third Circuit found that 
New Jersey’s new sports gambling law violated PASPA.14 This time, however, the Supreme 
Court granted review to decide the important constitutional question of whether PASPA violated 
the anticommandeering doctrine.15 
B. Holding and Reasoning 
 
In a 7–2 decision written by Justice Samuel Alito, the Supreme Court held that PASPA’s 
prohibition on the authorization of sports gambling violated the anticommandeering rule.16 The 
Court began by explaining that the anticommandeering doctrine “is simply the expression of a 
fundamental structural decision incorporated into the Constitution, i.e., the decision to withhold 
from Congress the power to issue orders directly to the States.”17 The Tenth Amendment of the 
																																								 																				
5 28 U.S.C. § 3702 (2012), invalidated by Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).  
6 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1471 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 3704(a)(1)–(2)). 
7 Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 3704(a)(3)). 
8 See id. (citing 2011 N.J. Laws 1723). 
9 Id.  
10 Id. (citing Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013)). 
11 See id. at 1472 (citing Christie v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 S. Ct. 2866 (2014)). 
12 See id. (citing 2014 N.J. Laws 602). 
13 See id.  
14 Id. (citing Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, 832 F.3d 389 (3d Cir. 2016)), rev’d sub nom. Murphy 
v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018). 
15 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1473. 
16 Id. at 1468, 1478. 
17 Id. at 1475. 
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Constitution, as the Court explained, confirms that all legislative powers not delegated to 
Congress are reserved for the States.18 Accordingly, the Court reasoned that PASPA’s ban on the 
authorization of sports gambling achieved exactly what the anticommandeering doctrine 
prevents—it “unequivocally dictate[d] what a state legislature may and may not do.”19 
The Court also rejected the argument that PASPA’s ban on the authorization of sports 
gambling constituted a valid preemption provision.20 For the provision to preempt state law, “it 
must represent the exercise of a power conferred on Congress by the Constitution.”21 The 
provision must also “be best read as one that regulates private actors.”22 The Court reasoned that 
PASPA’s prohibition on the authorization of sports gambling was not a valid preemption 
“because there is no way in which this provision can be understood as a regulation of private 
actors.”23 The provision, as the Court explained, did not confer any federal rights on private 
actors, nor did it impose any federal restrictions on private actors.24 
Having concluded that PASPA’s ban on the authorization of sports gambling violated the 
anticommandeering doctrine, the Court then considered whether the rest of PASPA could be 
severed, and thus survive. For the remainder of PASPA to fail, it must be “evident that 
[Congress] would not have enacted those provisions which are within its power, independently 
of [those] which [are] not.”25 In other words, the question is whether the law remains “fully 
operative” without the invalid provisions.26 
In a 6–3 vote, the Supreme Court held that no PASPA provisions were severable.27 
PASPA prohibited the spread of State-run sports lotteries.28 The court reasoned that Congress 
would not have wanted to continue preventing States from operating sports lotteries if private 
sports gambling were permitted.29 State-run lotteries “were thought more benign than other 
forms of gambling.”30 As the Court explained, legalizing sports gambling in privately owned 
casinos while prohibiting State-run sports lotteries “would have seemed exactly backwards.”31 
Similarly, the Court reasoned that if Congress had known that States would be free to 
authorize sports gambling, Congress would not have wanted to continue the restrictions on 
private entities.32 “Under [PASPA] § 3702(2), private conduct violates federal law only if it is 
																																								 																				
18 Id. at 1476. 
19 Id. at 1478. 
20 Id. at 1479. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 1481. 
24 See id. 
25 Id. at 1482 (citing Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
26 Id. (citing Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 509 (2010)). 
27 See id. at 1484. 
28 See id. at 1482. 
29 See id. 
30 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1482. 
31 Id. at 1483. 
32 See id. 





permitted by state law.”33 As the Court demonstrated, if a State’s people supported the 
legalization of sports gambling, federal law would still make the activity illegal.34 But if a State 
outlawed gambling, that activity would be lawful under PASPA.35 The Court did not think that 
Congress “ever contemplated that such a weird result would come to pass.”36 
PASPA’s prohibition on advertising sports gambling was also deemed inseverable.37 If 
the advertising prohibition remained, “federal law would forbid the advertising of an activity that 
is legal under both federal and state law, and that is something that Congress has rarely done.”38 
Accordingly, the Court ruled that legalizing sports gambling is not the Court’s decision to 
make.39 “Congress can regulate sports gambling directly, but if it elects not to do so, each State is 
free to act on its own.”40 
III. ANALYSIS OF THE MURPHY RATIONALE 
A. Does PASPA Violate the Anticommandeering Doctrine? 
PASPA violates the core tenants of dual sovereignty by forcing States to prohibit sports 
gambling, regardless of each State’s preferences. Such federal overreach is in direct conflict with 
a State’s freedom to enact, modify, and repeal its own laws as it sees fit. The anticommandeering 
doctrine exists to secure a fundamental concept that is incorporated into the Constitution—the 
autonomy of each State to wield sovereign powers. In Murphy v. NCAA, the Supreme Court 
correctly applied the anticommandeering rule and precluded Congress from issuing direct orders 
to State governments. 
“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it 
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”41 “Congress exercises its 
conferred powers subject to the limitations contained in the Constitution.”42 Thus, “Congress 
may not simply ‘commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling 
them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.’”43 
The Constitution explicitly “confers upon Congress the power to regulate individuals, not 
States.”44 For example, in Printz v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the Federal 
Government could not require local law-enforcement officers to perform background checks for 
																																								 																				
33 Id.  
34 Id. at 1483–84. 
35 Id. at 1484. 
36 Id. 
37 See id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 1484–85. 
41 U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
42 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992). 
43 Id. at 161 (citing Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)). 
44 Id. at 166. 
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gun sales.45 By contrast, in South Carolina v. Baker, the Supreme Court upheld a federal tax law 
that did not “seek to control or influence the manner in which States regulate private parties.”46 
Here, PASPA § 3702(1) makes it unlawful for “a governmental entity to sponsor, 
operate, advertise, promote, license, or authorize by law or compact . . . a lottery, sweepstakes, or 
other betting, gambling, or wagering scheme based . . . on one or more competitive games in 
which amateur or professional athletes participate.”47 In other words, PASPA commands States 
to refrain from authorizing sports gambling laws. This provision requires State governmental 
entities to regulate their citizens in a certain way, which is similar to the law in Printz v. United 
States that the Court deemed unconstitutional.48 Moreover, unlike the tax law in South Carolina 
v. Baker, PASPA’s prohibition on authorizing sports gambling was an obvious attempt to control 
or influence the way a State government regulates private parties.49  
As the Court explained in Murphy, the counterargument that PASPA imposes a 
prohibition rather than commands affirmative action is empty.50 “[T]here is simply no way to 
understand the provision prohibiting state authorization as anything other than a direct command 
to the States,”51 which is exactly what the anticommandeering doctrine prohibits.52 Put simply, 
PASPA commands State governments, rather than private individuals, to act—or not act—in a 
certain way. Accordingly, the Supreme Court in Murphy correctly precluded Congress from 
commandeering State processes, and PASPA does not preempt state law.  
B. Are the Unconstitutional PASPA Provisions Severable? 
Congress likely would not have wanted to retain the remaining PASPA provisions if it 
was aware that a State could authorize its own sports gambling laws. Without rewriting the law 
altogether, PASPA fails to remain fully operative without its prohibition against State-authorized 
sports gambling. Thus, the Supreme Court correctly ruled that no PASPA provisions should 
survive.  
The Court will sever provisions if it is “evident that the Legislature would not have 
enacted those provisions which are within its power, independently of [those] which [are] not.”53 
In other words, the question is whether the surviving provisions remain “fully operative” after 
severing the invalid provisions.54 
To be severable, provisions must be capable of “functioning independently.”55 For 
example, in Free Enterprise Fund, the Supreme Court held that part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
																																								 																				
45 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997). 
46 South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 514 (1988). 
47 28 U.S.C. § 3702(1) (2012). 
48 See Printz, 521 U.S. at 933. 
49 See South Carolina, 485 U.S. at 514. 
50 See Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1478 (2018). 
51 Id. at 1481. 
52 Id. 
53 Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987). 
54 See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 509 (2012). 
55 See id. 





was unconstitutional.56 However, the Court severed and upheld the remaining provisions of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act because the “remaining provisions [were] not ‘incapable of functioning 
independently.’”57 By contrast, in Railroad Retirement Board, the Supreme Court held that 
certain provisions of the Railroad Retirement Act were inseverable because it was “unthinkable” 
and “impossible” that Congress would have created the act without its unenforceable 
provisions.58 
 PASPA prohibited the spread of private sports gambling and State-run sports lotteries.59 
If States were free to authorize sports gambling in privately owned establishments, it is hard to 
imagine that Congress would have wanted to continue prohibiting State-operated sports lotteries. 
Prohibiting the States from reaping the economic benefits of a commercial activity seems against 
the best interests of the States, especially if that activity is already permitted between private 
parties.  
Further, Congress intended every PASPA provision to work in tandem. Under § 3702(2), 
private conduct violates PASPA only if the party acted pursuant to state law.60 If the Court 
severed § 3702(2) from § 3701(1), States would have legal authority to authorize private sports 
gambling, yet PASPA would still prohibit private actors from gambling. Although § 3702(2) 
may be capable of functioning independently, such functioning would be in direct conflict with 
the voters’ wishes. Congress would have never enacted PASPA without its unenforceable 
provisions, just as Congress would have never passed the Railroad Retirement Act without the 
provisions that the Court found unconstitutional in Railroad Retirement Board.61  
PASPA is simply incapable of fully operating without its prohibition on State-authorized 
sports gambling. Elected officials would have never intended to belittle the democratic process 
by enacting policy that directly contradicts public opinion. Accordingly, the Supreme Court in 
Murphy correctly ruled that no PASPA provisions should survive.  
IV. CONCLUSION: EXISTING LAWS AND PUBLIC POLICY 
The anticommandeering doctrine promotes political and economic accountability.62 
Congress must conduct an economic cost analysis when it regulates activities directly.63 
However, such an economic analysis is needless at the federal level when Congress can simply 
force States to regulate on its behalf.64 Forcing States to regulate shifts the economic burdens of 
regulation to the States, regardless of the State’s individual economic conditions.65 Despite being 
largely prohibited, sports gambling remains a massive black-market industry. Regulating such an 
industry requires tremendous economic contributions. Absent the anticommandeering doctrine, 
																																								 																				
56 Id. at 492. 
57 Id. at 509. 
58 See R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 362 (1935). 
59 See 28 U.S.C. § 3702 (2012). 
60 Id. § 3702(2). 
61 See R.R. Ret. Bd., 295 U.S. at 362. 
62 See Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1477 (2018). 
63 See id. 
64 See id.  
65 See id. 
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Congress could freely use the States as its economic pawns. The decision to legalize—or not 
legalize—sports gambling is best left to each individual State.  
Many federal laws governing marijuana, gun ownership, and immigration arguably 
commandeer State processes. Thus, the Supreme Court’s decision in Murphy will likely have 
profound effects on these cases that involve a struggle between state and federal law. The 
Murphy ruling stands as a correct decision in favor of political accountability, dual sovereignty, 
and sound economic policy.  
